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Justifying Government as the Backstop in Health
Insurance Markets
Katherine Swartz, Ph.D.*t
Disasters-earthquakes, floods, hurricanes, forest fires, or terrorist
attacks-usually bring out selfless behavior as people band together to help
those in need. Disasters and our responses to them are reminders that we
are in a society together. Unfortunately, for at least the last fifty years, this
image of one society has faded when we have tried to work out details for
implementing universal health insurance in the United States. A large part
of the disagreement about how to achieve universal coverage is over the
extent to which we are willing to allow government to intervene in private
markets. Yet disasters provide a blueprint for what the role of government
might be to help private health insurance markets work more efficiently
for everyone and to enable more people to obtain coverage.
Throughout our history, philosophical arguments about the role of
government in a market-oriented society have shaped many of our laws
and the division of responsibilities among the federal and state
governments and the private sector. In the last three decades, economists
and, increasingly, politicians have argued that the free market advances
economic growth and opportunity more effectively than government
policies intended to achieve such goals. This view rests on the widespread
belief among American economists that competitive forces yield efficiency
in both the production and the allocation of goods and services.' Moving
from a static to a dynamic context, economists also see free market
competition as a strong spur to innovation. As the view has taken hold that
competition yields efficiency in markets, policy-makers have paid
increasing attention to the way in which government regulation might
inhibit competition and incentives for companies in a market to be
* Katherine Swartz is a Professor of Health Policy and Economics in the Department of
Health Policy and Management at the Harvard School of Public Health.
t The author acknowledges support from the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, under
grant number 033818, and the Russell Sage Foundation, where she was a Visiting Scholar
for the 2000-2001 academic year. All opinions expressed in the Article are her own and
should not be attributed to either foundation, their boards of trustees, or to Harvard
University. The author also thanks Sara G. Cooper and Frank Levy for their thoughtful
comments on an earlier draft of the Article; they are absolved of any remaining errors.
1
Swartz: Justifying Government as the Backstop in Health Insurance Markets
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2002
YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS
efficient. There is now a widespread belief among economists, policy
analysts, and policy-makers that government should intervene in a market
only when conditions for competition are not in place, and the market fails
to be efficient.
In the case of health insurance, the absence of a competitive market
can arise for a variety of reasons. Within a geographic area, there are
traditional concerns about monopolies. There are also more subtle
concerns involving the role of information. Perfect competition requires
that all market participants have perfect information on what is being
bought and sold. By contrast, health insurance markets can be plagued by
adverse selection-the phenomenon in which people who anticipate high
2medical care costs will be most likely to purchase health insurance. One
consequence of the possibility of adverse selection is the extensive use of
screening mechanisms by insurers to avoid high-risk (potentially high-cost)
enrollees. This results in people who are perceived to be high-risk being
unable to obtain coverage at affordable premiums, or denied coverage
altogether. It also results in inefficiency in the health insurance markets as
insurers invest in the non-productive efforts of screening to avoid high-risk
people. Such efforts increase the costs of insurance for all who obtain
coverage.
The role of government in dealing with disasters provides us with a
blueprint for how government might reduce inefficiency in health
insurance markets. Insurers almost always judge the risks of large-scale
losses in the event of a disaster as too great to insure against, and they then
refuse to sell coverage for such possibilities. Earthquake insurance is hard
to obtain in areas that are prone to earthquakes, and it is increasingly
difficult to purchase insurance for hurricane damage in coastal areas that
are subject to hurricanes. But markets for property damage, casualty, and
liability insurance exist and are relatively competitive. Why? The answer is
that the government (primarily the federal government) has increasingly
moved to provide disaster relief, thereby taking responsibility for the worst
or highest risks in these markets. Government plays a backstop role in
these markets by implicitly (if not explicitly) agreeing to be responsible for
a large share of the costs of future disasters. This role enables insurers to
cover lesser risks for property damage and liability, thereby allowing the
markets for such insurance to function.
Similarly, government could take responsibility for the costs of people
with the highest medical care expenses. That is, the government would
shift the risk of unexpectedly very high costs from the insurers to the broad
base of citizens and corporations from which it gathers general tax
revenues. This would enable insurers to offer health insurance for medical
IIl (2001)
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care costs below the 98th or 99th percentile of the distribution of all
medical care costs, and to be efficient in providing insurance since they
would not feel compelled to screen people the way they do now. By
backstopping the insurers, the government would ensure that the health
insurance market would be accessible to a broader set of people, and
would be more efficient, thereby enhancing social welfare.3 Having the
government backstop insurance markets so they function more efficiently
is similar to government enforcement of laws regarding property rights.
Without such enforcement, some markets might not function at all, and
others would be markedly less efficient because payments would have to be
made to middlemen to enforce a person's rights.
In this Article, I expand on the rationale for government taking on a
backstopping role in health insurance markets. I explain why health
insurance markets would be more efficient and how social welfare would
increase as a result. In Part I, I briefly review the two most frequently cited
economic arguments for government involvement with health insurance
markets. The argument that government contributes to the efficiency of
insurance markets by redistributing the costs of the highest risk individuals
builds on the more common argument that government should intervene
in markets when they fail to be competitive. In Part II, I discuss why
imperfect information creates market inefficiencies. In Part III, I describe
how health insurers compete, and why the small group and individual
(non-group) health insurance markets are inefficient. In Part IV, I suggest
how government might spread the costs of high-risk people, and discuss
why the government would reduce inefficiency in the insurance markets if
it were a backstop for markets by removing the worst risks.
I. ECONOMICJUSTIFICATIONS FOR GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT IN HEALTH
INSURANCE
Economic theory offers two justifications for intervention in the
economy.4 The first involves redistributing resources to assist poor or
otherwise deserving groups of people who are unable to afford goods (like
food or health care) that are deemed to be necessities. The second
involves redressing causes of market failures-conditions of various kinds
that result in a failure to achieve economic efficiency.
A. Redistribution of Resources
Economists are concerned with both economic efficiency and the
distributional consequences of markets. When a market yields an
allocation of its product to various consumers in such a manner as to be
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judged unfair, many economists argue that a redistribution of resources
should occur to make the distribution fair. Unfortunately, it is difficult to
agree on what is a fair distribution, and even more difficult to agree on
why one allocation is better than another. Economics and philosophy
intersect when it comes to determining how we may or may not compare
different individuals' levels of happiness or welfare, and how we might
judge when one distribution of resources is better than another. Most
economists believe that different individuals' levels of happiness cannot be
compared to each other. This leaves economists in the awkward position of
not having a tidy method for declaring one distribution of resources fairer
than another. Instead, economists can say only that one group of people
benefits or bears the burden of some policy or market outcome. We often
observe a redistribution of resources when the public or policy-makers
judge it to be unfair that a group within society has a disproportionate
share of the benefits or burden.
Most economists argue that such resource redistributions should take
place outside the market in order to leave the market's efficiency-
enhancing incentives as intact as possible. This argument prefers a direct
income transfer like food stamps to a policy of price controls on food. The
food stamps do not alter the prices that farmers receive for their products,
and they do not cause higher-income people to purchase more food as
they might if all food prices were artificially low. The redistributive
justification for government involvement with the economy also explains
the genesis of Medicare and Medicaid. They are a response to the
argument that access to health care should not depend on ability to pay,
and therefore government has a responsibility to guarantee financial
access to medical care.5 Both programs involve redistributing tax revenues
from the general population to pay for medical care for people who enroll
in the programs.
Although many Americans believe it is unfair that one in six people
are without health insurance, there is widespread disagreement about how
redistribution of resources might be accomplished so that everyone would
have health coverage. There is no clear mechanism for providing health
insurance to everyone without hurting the interests of some people, usually
the wealthy. This has hampered advocates of expanding health insurance
who have relied on the redistribution rationale for government
involvement in the economy.
B. Economic Efficiency and Market Failure
The second economics justification for government intervention
involves market failure. Historically, markets were said to fail when they
11:1 (2001)
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were inefficient-a situation that occurs when individuals bear either more
or less than the full costs of resources they consume, or fail to receive the
full benefits of products they produce. These conditions could arise from
any of three general cases:
1. Market Power. A market is controlled by one or several producers
who do not compete with each other and who block competition from
potential new entrants. For example, a group of radiologists supply all the
radiology services in a town and effectively bar any new radiologists from
contracting with the town hospitals. In this case, consumers are likely to be
charged more than the full cost of services consumed.
2. Negative and Positive Externalities. An individual's action creates a cost
(or benefit) for others for which the individual does not pay (or is not
rewarded). For example, without environmental regulation, a factory
would have little incentive to consider the costs its pollution imposes on
others. Without a patent system, an inventive person would have little
incentive to develop ideas that could be freely copied.
3. Public Goods. Goods like public health or national security, which,
once created, can be universally consumed and cannot be restricted to
only the individuals who paid for the good.
In the last thirty years, these three classical reasons for market failure
have been joined by a fourth-asymmetric information. Asymmetric
information was the subject of the 2001 Nobel Prize in Economics. The
three prize recipients (Joseph Stiglitz, George Akerlof, and Michael
Spence) made explicit another assumption of the competitive model-that
people have full information about what they are buying or selling-and
showed the consequences when that condition is not met. Asymmetric
information is increasingly cited as a barrier to competitive markets and
therefore a reason for market failure in health care and health insurance
markets.
Debates about whether government should intervene in markets have
almost always turned on the interpretation of evidence for and against the
presence of one or more of these four causes of market failure.
Government interventions in markets are generally in the form of
regulations to prohibit or require certain activities, or taxes and subsidies
to alter the relative prices of products. The intent of these actions is to
alter the constraints and incentives that producers and consumers face in a
market so the market becomes more competitive and, therefore, more
efficient.
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II. ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AND HEALTH INSURANCE
The focus of this Article is how the government might address
asymmetric information's effects in health insurance markets, and
therefore it is important to understand why imperfect information causes
markets to fail to be efficient. In general, when consumers and producers
do not have the same information, the information asymmetry favors
producers because consumers have difficulty obtaining a great deal of
information. For example, when consumers do not purchase a good
frequently (such as a car), it is difficult to know about all the price and
quality differences among cars and among car dealers.6 Public policies
often have been designed to provide information to consumers so as to
redress the information asymmetry between consumers and producers. In
the case of cars, most states now require car dealers to disclose the cost of
the car to the dealer and the additional mark-ups that the dealer has
added.
In health insurance markets, the information asymmetry generally
favors consumers. Consumers know far more about why they wish to
purchase health insurance than indemnity insurers or managed care
organizations (hereafter collectively referred to as carriers) can ever know.
Carriers know from experience that people who know or suspect they will
have expensive health care needs in the coming year are more likely to
apply for insurance coverage than are those who think they are quite
healthy. This creates an adverse selection problem because carriers do not
have full information to correctly distinguish between low-risk and high-
risk applicants. As a result, explained more fully in the next Part, the
carriers compete in terms of mechanisms to screen out high-risk people.
This type of competition yields inefficiency in health insurance markets
because the carriers spend resources on activities that do not produce
insurance per se. In addition, the selection activities limit the access to
health insurance for those individuals perceived to be high-risk, as
compared to their lower-risk contemporaries.
III. HEALTH INSURANCE MARKETS AND How CARRIERS COMPETE
In the United States, the majority of people obtain health care
coverage through employers. Approximately 64% of the population (of all
ages) have employer-sponsored group coverage.7 Those with such coverage
pool their own risks of high medical care costs with other individuals
covered by the same employer. Because almost everyone in large employer
groups participates in the employer-sponsored health insurance plan,
there is only a small proportion of each group that is likely to have
11:1 (2001)
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unexpectedly high medical expenses. But people who do not have access
to such pooling of risks-the uninsured and the people who obtain
individual coverage-face insurance markets in which adverse selection is a
major problem.
Health insurance is sold in the United States in three interconnected
markets. We can loosely distinguish between large employer group, small
group, and individual (non-group) insurance markets. Some carriers
actively sell coverage in all three markets, but most do not. More often, we
observe large carriers selling coverage to large employer groups, with some
of the major large carriers selling policies in the small group and
individual markets. Smaller carriers sell policies almost exclusively in the
small group and individual markets. In addition to these three types of
markets, every state (and the District of Columbia) regulates how
insurance is sold within its borders. The states have different regulations
governing facets of insurance ranging from what benefits must be covered
by insurance policies to how rates are determined to requirements about
financial reserves that the carriers must hold. As a result, there are fifty-one
different sub-markets within each of the three distinct markets. Many
carriers, particularly smaller carriers, offer policies only in those states with
similar regulations so they do not have to keep track of, and respond to,
many regulatory changes. One consequence of this is that in the individual
markets in 1997, the number of carriers selling individual policies ranged
from two or three (in Delaware, Idaho, and Alaska) to more than forty (in
New York and Texas). 8 New York's relatively large number of carriers
selling individual coverage is due to the requirement that all HMOs sell
individual coverage. In 1997, just under 700 carriers sold individual
policies in the United States; by comparison, 2,450 carriers sold policies in
the large and small group markets.9 In spite of this difference, the
individual and group markets are characterized by a small number of
carriers having at least half of the total number of policies sold in each type
of market in each state.'l
Large employers have avoided state regulations and state taxes on
health insurance by self-insuring (or self-financing) their employees'
health care costs. The Employees Retirement and Income Security Act of
1974 (ERISA) exempts self-insured employers from state regulations and
taxes on policies sold within a state. Most self-insured employers pay a fee
to a third-party administrator (almost always a carrier) to administer the
claims from medical care providers, and the employees are usually
unaware that the third-party administrator is not technically their insurer
as well.
Health coverage is sold and priced quite differently in the three types
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of health insurance markets (ignoring for the moment the fifty-one
different jurisdictions' regulations). The selling practices and pricing
differences largely reflect the extent to which carriers fear adverse
selection in each of the markets. In the large group market, adverse
selection at the group level is uncommon since almost all employees of a
large employer enroll for coverage. However, when an employer offers a
choice of plans, those carriers that are the choice of a small proportion of
the group may be concerned about adverse selection." Employees and
their dependents in large group plans pay average premiums based on the
total expected costs of the group; a particular person's expected medical
care costs are not factored into the premium he or she pays. Usually, the
employer also negotiates with several carriers as to the out-of-pocket cost
sharing and benefits covered, and trade-offs between these and the
premiums."
Small groups (typically, groups with less than fifty employees) and
individuals face very different markets. Per policy premiums are
substantially higher in these markets; it is not unusual to find premiums
for single or family policies to be more than twice as expensive for small
groups or individuals than for large groups. 3 Carriers' fear of adverse
selection among applicants in the small group and individual markets
motivates the carriers' behaviors. Insurers fear adverse selection because it
causes them to underestimate premium revenues needed to cover
expenditures and thus to risk substantial financial losses. To avoid adverse
selection, many carriers adopt selection mechanisms to screen out
applicants who they suspect will use expensive medical care. 4 Such
mechanisms include medical underwriting practices, 5 refusing to issue or
renew a policy, excluding coverage of services for pre-existing medical
conditions, and differentiating their policies from their competitors' by
generously covering some types of services (e.g., preventative), but limiting
coverage of other services (e.g., substance abuse treatment 6 ) .17
Thus, competition in insurance markets, especially the small group
and individual markets, focuses on how well carriers use mechanisms to
identify which firms or individuals might be high-risk versus low-risk. When
carriers are permitted to set different premiums for people who the
carriers predict will have different probabilities of using expensive medical
care, they compete in large part in terms of the accuracy of their models
for predicting a person's (or firm's) medical expenses.' Different carriers
will then price their health insurance policies to people and small firms
based on the individual's or firm's expenditures predicted by each carrier's
actuarial model. Usually, the models are used to determine how the
premiums might be "underwritten" for particular individuals or firms. That
11:1 (2001)
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is, if a small firm is predicted to have a high risk of high medical expenses
in the next year because several people in the group had high expenses in
the last year, the carrier may agree to offer insurance only if the firm pays a
substantially higher premium in the coming year. The additional premium
amount underwrites the basic premium for the policy.
Underwriting principles might also cause a carrier to deny coverage
completely or to exclude coverage for a condition to a group or person on
the basis of information known by the carrier. Most states allow exclusion
of coverage for a pre-existing condition (such as cancer, osteoarthritis, or
allergies) for a limited time period-typically twelve months. As a result,
carriers more often simply deny an application if a person has had serious
conditions, such as angina or a myocardial infarction.19 In some states,
underwriting of premiums is not permitted because it is viewed as a
selection mechanism that discriminates against people who are perceived
to have high risks of expensive medical care. When underwriting is not
permitted or its use is restricted, carriers turn to other selection
mechanisms to avoid insuring high-risk people.
A frequently used mechanism for separating high- and low-risk
applicants consists of differentiating the benefits (or medical services)
covered by a policy. If a carrier is able to identify a health care benefit that
is particularly attractive to low-risk people but not high-risk people, then it
can design policies that cause people voluntarily to reveal whether they are
likely to be low- or high-risk. Thus, for example, if a person knows that
cancer runs in his or her family-which the carriers do not know-the
person might choose a policy that has high upper limits on covered
expenses, provides for cancer screening tests, and includes first-rate cancer
centers in the list of providers. By choosing such a policy, the person is
revealing information to the carrier regarding his or her risk expectations.
Carriers have invested in substantial efforts to understand how differences
in benefits packages can be used to attract low-risk people to some policies
and high-risk people to other policies.
Carriers also have developed monopolistic market niches in the small
group and individual markets as another mechanism for avoiding adverse
selection. 0 In the individual markets, for example, some carriers specialize
in marketing to individuals who have left the armed services; others
specialize in policies attractive to very small firms of professionals (e.g.,
lawyers or financial advisors) or only to individuals who are self-employed.
As a result, few carriers in a state market actively compete for business
among all consumers seeking individual policies, and people who carriers
perceive as high-risk have few, if any, options for obtaining health
insurance.21
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The differences in states' regulations of the insurance markets within
their borders permit greater or lesser use of these mechanisms or different
combinations of the strategies to avoid insuring high-risk people. States
that have attempted to block carriers' use of such preferential selection
mechanisms, particularly in the small group or individual markets, have
almost always set up regulations that block the use of only one or two of
these mechanisms. State regulations, for example, might mandate that all
policies sold in the state must cover substance abuse treatment to inhibit
carriers' abilities to avoid people who want coverage for substance abuse.
Some states have enacted regulations requiring carriers to accept any
applicant ("guaranteed issue") so a carrier cannot turn down an applicant
it views as high-risk. For example, carriers in the individual insurance
markets in Washington, New York, and New Jersey are required to issue
policies to any applicant regardless of the applicant's health status, age, or
place of residence. But, of course, if a state has only one or two of these
regulations in place, the carriers can use other mechanisms that are not
proscribed to accomplish the same objective. A common example is when
a state requires carriers to accept any applicant, but does not also have a
regulation governing the way in which premiums can be set, we observe
what should be an expected outcome-high-risk people are indeed offered
coverage, but at an extraordinarily high premium. Similarly, when states
require community rating of premiums (say, in the small group insurance
market), but do not standardize the benefits to be covered in policies sold
in the market, carriers can use differences in what benefits are covered
under different policies to try to separate employers with large fractions of
high-risk employees from those with large fractions of low-risk employees.
In summation, the information asymmetries in health insurance
markets, particularly the small group and individual markets, cause them
to be inefficient. Carriers compete with each other not in terms of
producing insurance per se at the lowest possible cost, but in terms of
insuring as high a proportion of low-risk people as possible to keep costs
low. Thus, the usual competitive market forces that cause producers to
seek profits by reducing their costs of production and increasing market
share have been altered by the fear of adverse selection in insurance
markets. In insurance, carriers seek to minimize their risk of unexpected
high costs by competing to have very high shares of low-risk people among
the people they insure. The competition among carriers consists of trying
to do better than other carriers at selecting low-risk people, which involves
efforts that do not contribute to producing insurance. The costs of
creating and using selection mechanisms are a measure of the inefficiency
that exists in health insurance markets.
11:1 (2001)
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IV. GOVERNMENT AS DISTRIBUTOR OF RISK
The economy can produce more when risks in markets are reduced by
actions that pool risks and/or shift risk to people who are willing to bear
the risk in exchange for a payment. Insurance markets that might be
formed to address risk-such as the risk of unexpectedly high medical care
costs-will form and be efficient if the risk is truly random and unrelated
to any observable characteristic of a person or entity seeking insurance.
But as we have seen, if there are characteristics associated with higher risk,
a potential insurance market is faced with an information problem that
manifests itself as adverse selection. When adverse selection occurs, a
market will be inefficient because of the efforts spent trying to detect the
information-or a market can fail even to form. However, if the
government acts to cover the costs of the worst risks, an inefficient market
can become more efficient, and a non-functioning market can be
stimulated to form. In particular, if the government removed the risk to
carriers of very high-cost people, carriers would not have to spend as much
on selection mechanisms to avoid insuring high-risk people.
The government has two options for shifting the risk of very high-cost
people from carriers: (1) provide financial coverage outright; or (2) take
on the role of reinsurer. Both options rely on the government's ability to
tax a broader segment of the population than just those individuals with
coverage through the individual or small group markets.
A. Provide Insurance Coverage
Medicare, Medicaid, and the Veterans Administration's health care are
all examples of government-provided financial coverage of health care
costs. As noted earlier, the establishment of Medicare and Medicaid was
justified in part because they redistribute resources to deserving groups of
people: the elderly, disabled, and very poor. Medicare was also justified
because disabled and senior citizens found it virtually impossible to obtain
health insurance prior to 1965 at a price they could afford. People who
have served in the armed forces of the United States are covered by the
health care program of the Veterans Administration (VA) for medical
problems caused by their active duty. The VA was created in part to
provide efficacious medical care to people who might have injuries or
problems that the civilian population generally does not have. Having
centers of expertise in VA hospitals is both more efficient and more
effective than relying on physicians and hospitals scattered across the
country with little experience with such problems. Additionally, without
the presence of the VA, carriers might charge very high rates to veterans
11
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and/or refuse to cover medical services that might be related to injuries or
medical problems incurred in the armed forces. These three government
programs provide coverage to specific groups of people who have higher
than average probabilities of needing high-cost medical care, and
consequently would have difficulty obtaining health insurance in the
private markets.
The government could provide similar health insurance programs to
other identifiable groups of people who are perceived as very likely to have
high expenses and therefore have trouble obtaining private coverage. Ex
ante, however, it is difficult to identify other "targetable" groups of people
who are likely to have high medical expenses-which is why the carriers
spend an enormous amount of effort trying to avoid covering high-risk
people. However, the government could target people for programs ex post,
perhaps by identifying individuals with medical expenses that put them in
the top 1% or 2% of the distribution of medical expenses of the entire
population. Once a person was identified as being "high cost," the
government would pay all of the person's medical expenses. Such a
government sponsored "high-cost" program would drastically reduce
carriers' incentives to spend resources on selection mechanisms.
B. Government as Reinsurer
The other option for the government's role in health insurance
markets is to become a reinsurer for carriers that have covered high-cost
people. That is, the government could pay a portion of the costs of those
individuals whose total annual medical costs exceed some threshold-say,
$30,000-or an amount that places a person's medical expenditures above
the 98th or 99th percentile of the entire population's distribution of
medical expenses. Carriers often purchase reinsurance to protect
themselves from the risk that an insured's claims will exceed $50,000.22
Private reinsurance reduces a carrier's exposure to the risk of high-cost
enrollees; the costs of the reinsurance fall on the other individuals
obtaining coverage from the carrier. These costs, in addition to the higher
premiums due to high-cost enrollees, fall totally on a carrier's enrollees-
reinforcing carriers' fears that they will lose low-cost enrollees if such costs
continue to rise. Instead, if the government acted as the reinsurer for the
high-cost claims, the costs of the reinsurance and the higher expenditures
being reinsured would be shifted from the carrier's enrollees. Carriers
would then have far less incentive to avoid high-risk people.
Reinsurance usually requires the original insurer (the carrier) to bear
some portion of the costs above the threshold so the carrier will still have
an incentive to continue to manage the health care of high-cost people. It
11:l1(2001)
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would be important to retain this incentive if the government were to
reinsure the very high medical care expenses. Moreover, the government
could cover either a portion of the costs above the threshold that causes a
person's expenses to be eligible or a portion of all of the costs. In either
case, the share of costs that the government would cover also could vary
over different levels of expenditures. For example, the government could
cover 80% of the costs above the eligibility threshold up to two times the
threshold, and then 90% of the costs above that.
Either of the options discussed above would curtail the use of selection
mechanisms to avoid high-risk enrollees and would, therefore, make the
market more efficient. These changes would immediately provide what
economists call a "welfare" gain to everyone who purchases health
insurance in the small group or individual insurance markets since the
premiums for insurance would decline in proportion to the reduction in
use of selection mechanisms.23 Moreover, high-risk people who currently
cannot obtain coverage from all carriers also would benefit because
carriers would no longer deem them undesirable. High-risk people would
have greater access to carriers and policies in insurance markets.
The welfare gains caused by the increased efficiency in the insurance
markets brought about by either of the government options are not "free,"
of course. Both options require government revenues to pay all or some of
the medical care costs of the designated high-cost people. Three major
types of taxes could be used to pay these high medical costs: (1) payroll
tax; (2) income tax; or, (3) head tax. Moving from a payroll to income to
head tax involves an expanding subset of the population, but each tax has
different impacts on the after-tax income distribution. Payroll taxes are a
percent of wages and salaries, and are paid only by people who are
working. Income taxes apply to all forms of income (e.g., salary, rental
property income, and investment earnings) and are generally more
progressive than either a payroll or head tax since higher income people
are taxed at higher rates than lower income people. A head tax is
independent of income and applies to every person in the country
regardless of age. In addition, all of the revenue sources for the states' and
federal governments' general revenue funds-including fines or
settlement agreements paid by corporations (e.g., the tobacco settlement
funds) and excise taxes not dedicated to other purposes-could be used if
the general revenue funds were tapped to finance high-cost medical
expenses.
A political advantage of using the income tax and sources of revenues
for the general revenue funds is that they do not require implementation
of a new tax to pay for either a new insurance program for high-cost
13
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people or a reinsurance fund to pay carriers for high-cost claims. On the
other hand, when a program is competing for general revenue funds along
with high-visibility government programs-such as education, highway
maintenance and construction, or homeland security-then it is
vulnerable to budget-cutting pressures. This is particularly true for
programs that benefit everyone but may appear to assist only a small
number of people, in this case those individuals with high-cost claims. The
argument has to be made that both of the government options for high-
cost individuals increase the efficiency of insurance markets, thereby
providing benefits to everyone.
Implementing an institutional structure to permit the government to
take responsibility for the health care expenses of the very high-cost
individuals would also require some standardization of health policies sold
in the small group and individual markets. Standardizing the benefits
covered by policies would make it possible to compare medical
expenditure patterns of people and then to identify those people who have
the very highest medical expenses. Without such standardization, it would
be quite difficult to know whether a person had high expenditures because
of a very generous insurance policy as opposed to being quite ill.
Finally, by providing either total coverage or reinsurance for very high
medical care costs, the government would provide stability to health
insurance markets. Stability contributes to efficiency in markets because
people are able to make choices about purchasing insurance with less
uncertainty about future premiums. When carriers find themselves in a
spiral of rising costs due to adverse selection and falling enrollment of low-
risk people, they often raise premiums to try to cover their anticipated
losses. But rapid premium increases cause lower-risk people to drop their
coverage, which further exacerbates the imbalance of costs and revenues
and often leads to a death spiral for a particular policy or carrier. A market
that is destabilized by rapidly rising premiums or loss of carriers will not
attract lower-risk people to purchase coverage, and ultimately will fail to
function.24
Thus, if government uses its power to redistribute the risk of very high
medical care costs from carriers to broader sub-groups of the population, it
would increase efficiency in health insurance markets-particularly the
small group and individual insurance markets. The increase in efficiency
would enable more people to obtain health insurance. Premiums would be
reduced because carriers would reduce their efforts to identify high-risk
people who they do not want to insure. As a result, relatively low-risk
people would be more likely to obtain and retain coverage. Higher-risk
people, who currently have great difficulty finding carriers willing to insure
11:1 (2001)
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them, would have more choice of policies and carriers since there would
be sharply reduced incentives for carriers to avoid higher-risk enrollees.
CONCLUSION
When markets fail, economic theory tells us that government should
intervene in the market so as to increase efficiency. When risk is present in
markets, such as health insurance markets, market failure can be especially
likely because of information asymmetry and the potential for adverse
selection. Risk also can prevent markets from forming. If government acts
to take care of or remove the worst risks in such markets, the inefficiency
in the markets would be greatly reduced, and markets that otherwise could
not even start up would be able to function.
There are precedents in other markets with risk where the federal
government has taken responsibility for the worst risks, thereby enabling
markets to function and grow. Reinsurance for catastrophes exists because
there has been a history (including the response to the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001) of government stepping in to pay large fractions of
the costs of catastrophes. Indeed, the creation of the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) in 1978 formally acknowledged the federal
government's role in assisting with recovery from catastrophes. The
secondary mortgage market, which enables lenders of mortgage money to
replenish their capital, exists because the federal government has
responsibility for the worst risk mortgages. The Federal Housing Authority
(FHA) and the VA shifted the risk of default from mortgage lenders to the
federal government for people who otherwise would not have qualified for
mortgage loans. Moreover, the FHA mortgage insurance and the VA
mortgage guarantee program set minimum standards for what properties
were eligible for mortgages and what types of financial information were
needed from borrowers. This standardization of information permitted
mortgages to be resold on a national basis because standardized
information made it easier for lending institutions that were not local to
perform due diligence investigations of mortgages that were offered for
resale in the secondary mortgage market. It is unlikely that either the
reinsurance market or the secondary mortgage market would function
without the government backstopping them by covering the worst risks.
Health insurance markets similarly need the government to spread
and redistribute the costs of those individuals with the highest medical
expenditures. If the government were to take responsibility for the highest
cost people, carriers in the small group and individual insurance markets
would spend less on efforts to avoid enrolling these individuals. This would
reduce the rates for health insurance faced by people who purchase
15
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insurance in these markets and enable a much larger set of people to
obtain health coverage-all of which would increase economic welfare for
the country.
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